Five Feeds, One Truth? Cross-Source Consistency of Fix Status, Severity, and Identifier Mapping Across GHSA, NVD, and OSV

Authors

Keywords:

vulnerability databases, GHSA, NVD, OSV, data consistency, vulnerability intelligence, advisory aggregation, digital trust

Abstract

Background: A single software vulnerability typically exists in four public records simultaneously: the CVE entry (CNA-authored), its NVD enrichment (CPE/CWE/CVSS), the GitHub Security Advisory (ecosystem-scoped, reviewed), and its OSV aggregation. These sources disagree — on affected version ranges, severity, and fix status — and consumers of vulnerability intelligence rarely reconcile them. Objective: We consolidate the published consistency evidence, formalize the inconsistency classes that matter to consumers, and assess the reconciliation mechanisms available in current tooling. Methods: Synthesis of the large-scale consistency literature (the VIEM measurement of 78,296 CVE/report pairs; the GHSA review-pipeline characterization), architectural analysis of the four-source data flow, and a six-class inconsistency-versus-reconciliation assessment. Results: The published record establishes that divergence is prevalent (only 59.82% of CVE/report pairs strictly matched NVD entries at VIEM's 2019 measurement, with inconsistency increasing over time), and the 2024-2026 structural changes — NVD enrichment triage, ADP parallel enrichment, GHSA's multi-source review pipeline — have multiplied the divergence surface. We identify six inconsistency classes and find that the strongest reconciliation mechanisms (canonical-record policies, field-level cross-validation) are organizational choices rather than shipped tooling: today's pipelines aggregate first and reconcile never. Conclusions: Cross-source consistency must become a measured property of vulnerability intelligence pipelines — with a declared canonical record, field-level validation, and time-stamped audits — or consumers will continue to receive silently conflicting answers to the same question.

References

1. S. Dong, M. Sun, B. Sun, T. Yang, and W. Meng, "Towards the Detection of Inconsistencies in Public Security Vulnerability Reports," in Proc. 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/dong

2. "Characterizing and Modeling the GitHub Security Advisories Review Pipeline," arXiv:2602.06009, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.06009

3. CVE Program, "CVE List syntax and record structure," cve.org. [Online]. Available: https://cveproject.github.io/

4. National Vulnerability Database, "CVEs and the NVD Process," NIST, Apr. 2026. [Online]. Available: https://nvd.nist.gov/general/cve-process

5. GitHub, "About the GitHub Security Advisory Database," GitHub Docs. [Online]. Available: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories

6. Google, "OSV Schema" (Open Source Vulnerabilities), osv.dev. [Online]. Available: https://ossf.github.io/osv-schema/

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Published

2026-10-30